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Agricultural DevelopInent Policy in West Malaysia
Yutaka SHIMOMOTO*
Introduction
The Malaysian Government has been
continuously pursuing a rural develop-
ment policy since independence. The
main export products of Malaysia in
1975 were rubber, tin, and palm oil,
which accounted for 25.3%, 15.70/0' and
15.40/0 of total exports respectively.I) To
improve the Malaysian economy, it IS
important to promote the cultivation of
such export crops as rubber and oil palm.
In padi cultivation, even though the
Government is encouraging double-crop-
ping in such northern states as Kedah,
Perlis, and Kelantan, West Malaysia has
had to import 79,000 tons of rice in 1975.2)
So far, the Government's various devel-
opment projects are working well and are
contributing positively to the economic
development of Malaysia.
I would like to analyze these develop-
ment projects from both economic and
political viewpoints. During the period
of the Second Malaysia Plan, M$I,835.6
million was allocated to agricultural and
* rJi: :ft, Consulate ofJapan, P. O. Box 1001,
Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia
I) This figure indicates only West Malaysia.
Malaysia Government, Malaysia 1975 Of-
.ticial Year Book (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia
Government, 1977), p. 519.
2) Ibid., p. 530.
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rural development projects. This ac-
counted for 27.8~~ of the total non-
security development expenditure.3) In
West Malaysia, the majority of rural
residents are Malays engaged in agricul-
ture. Therefore, the projects were ob-
viously aimed at improving the Malays'
economic standard. This becomes more
apparent if we focus on two Government
projects, the Federal Land Development
Authority (FELDA) and the· Muda Ir-
rigationScheme.
It is also necessary to clarify why the
Government emphasises rural (Malay)
development. In colonial times, the
British, for economic and paternalistic
reasons, intended Malays to engage in
padi cultivation. Meanwhile, the Chi-
nese and Indians engaged in tin mining
and plantation work, and later in com-
merce. Throughout British colonial rule,
most Malays remained in the rural areas
while the Chinese and Indians were
enjoying economic success. Thus eco-
nomic imbalance became a major cause
of social tension between the three ethnic
groups.
3) Colin MacAndrews, Mobility and Moderniza-
tion: The Federal Land Development Authority
and Its Role in Modernizing the Rural Malqy
(Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University
Press, 1977), p. 16.
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In this paper, I would like to discuss
British colonial agricultural policy and
how it influenced the present Govern-
ment's agricultural policy. I shall focus
on the FELDA and the Muda irrigation
Scheme.
I Early British Colonial Agri-
cultural Policy (1874-1906)
British intrusion into Malaya began
with the cession of Penang Island by the
Sultan of Kedah in 1786; Singapore and
Ma1acca came under British control in
1819 and 1824 respectively. At that
time, British trade with the :r-v1alay Sul-
tanates was small, with only jungle
products and tin exported via the Set-
tlements. The importance of the Straits
Settlements, especially Penang, was as
a trading port in East-West trade pro-
viding water and refitting. 4) Following
the increase of trade, the number of
residents in Penang increased. The im-
migrants cultivated various parts of the
island and at least 5,875 acres of land had
been cultivated by 1785.5) In 1790
pepper was introduced into Penang from
Sumatra, and many Chinese took up
pepper cultivation.6) The cultivation
was successful but due to the price decline,
pepper production decreased after 1810.7)
In addition, some Europeans attempted
to grow nutmegs and cloves in Penang.
But with few exceptions they were unsuc-
4) R. N. Jackson, Immigrant Labou1' and the De-
velopment of Malaya 1786-1920 (Kuala Lum-
pur: Government Press, 1961), p. 4.
5) Ibid., p. 5.
6) Ibid., pp. 9-10.
7) Ibid., p. 11.
cessful, because these plantations required
a large capital investment.8)
In 1800 Province Wellesley came under
the British control. After 1820, many
Chinese moved to the Province and
opened sugar plantations there. The
fertile lands, water communications, and
cheap firewood available in the south of
the Province lured many Chinese into
sugar production.9) These sugar plan-
tations required many laborers, as did
other types of plantations. Thus Chinese,
Indians, and Malays were employed in
the sugar plantations. At that time, la-
borers' wages were high, so that even the
local Malays were attracted to the planta-
tions. lO) Moreover, to escape Feudal
Service (forced labor for the Sultan), a
number of Malays fled to the British-
controlled areas of Penang and Pro-
vince Wellesley. Therefore, the towkays
(Chinese merchants) were able to employ
Malays in the Province.!l)
Overall, British intervention in Malaya
started with the establishment of the
Residential system in Perak after the
Pangkor Treaty in 1874. British colo-
nial policy toward Malaya was generally
one of non-interference in the early
colonial period, but there were some
exceptions. For example, ].W.W. Birch,
the first Resident of Perak, ignored the
traditional Malay customs and adminis-
trative systems, and he tried to establish
his own idealistic system. As a result,
8) Ibid., pp. 13-14.
9) Ibid., p. 14.
10) Ibid., pp. 16-17.
11) Ibid., p. 2.
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he was murdered in Lower Perak in
1875.12) This incident convinced the
British administrators that they should
embrace the policy of non-intervention
in Malay society.
The British concern In Malaya was to
maintain law and order. The decline
of tin production in 1872/3, because of
civil disorders, had a marked influence
on trade in Penang.13) As long as the
British could obtain supplies of tin from
Malaya, they were happy. But it is
noteworthy that the control of the Straits
of Malacca and possession of Malaya as
a hinterland of Singapore was also an
important concern of the British.
Apart from the negative British attitude
of non-intervention in Malay society,
there were some sympathetic, favorable,
but paternalistic attitudes towards
Malays. Hugh Clifford noted: "the peo-
ple as a whole were so generous and so
charitable to their neighbours that there
seem to be the makings of a very Garden
of Eden in these Malay lands. "14) Sir
Frank Swettenham wrote: "I never saw
a Malay child slapped, and they never
seem to cry unless they are ill."15) Lady
12) Mohamed Amin and Malcom Calbwell, ed.,
Malaya: The Making of a Neo-Colony (Not-
tingham: Spokesman, 1977), p. 65.
13) Lim, Teck Ghee, Peasants and Their Agri-
cultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874-
1941 (Penang: University Sains Malaysia,
1977), p. 24.
14) Clifford cited in Rex Stevenson, Cultivators
and Administrators (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1975), p. 6.
15) Sir Frank Swettenham, British Malaya: An
Account of the Origin and Progress of British
Influence in Malaya (London: Allen & Unwin,
Ltd., 1906), p. 135.
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Isabella Bird considered that "Malays
undoubtedly must be numbered among
civilized peoples. They live in houses
which are more or less tasteful and se-
cluded ... "16) Thus favorably impressed,
the early British Residents were able to live
closely with the Malays -learning their
language, eating their food, observing
their manners and sharing their homes.!?)
The favorable impression made by the
Malays, on the other hand, led the
British misinterpret Malay society. ]. F.
A. McNair wrote: "though he (the Ma-
lay) may not possess the native intelli-
gence of the Chinese as a trader and
artisan, nor the shrewd cleverness of the
Kling (Tamil) In his business and
monetary transactions, he will be found
no whit behind them in agricultural
pursuits ... "18) This misinterpretation
underlay the arrogant philosophy of the
British administrators who wrote:
... they do well to rely on the guidance
of those who best understand the
country's needs and who are collec-
tively known as the Government.
The Government, then, as a body of
wise people who bring their own par-
ticular knowledge, has certain duties
to perform.19)
These misinterpretations are symbolized
by Berkeley's innocent romanticism.
Purcell wrote:
16) Stevenson, Ope cit., p. 8.
17) Loc. cit.
18) Ibid., p. 10.
19) S. M. Middlebrook and A. W. Pinnick, How
Malaya is Governed (New York: AMS Press,
1975), p. 171.
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Berkeley successfully obstructed the
entry of Upper Perak into the modern
world for the period of his regime. He
would, for example, not allow any roads
to be built, so that up to recent years
it was possible to get from the district
capital, Grik, to the rest of Perak only
by making a detour of a hundred miles
or so via Province Wellesley.20)
The colonial economy at the end of the
1800s comprised a number of tin mines
and some plantations in the Federated
Malay States. Unlike tin mining, the
plantations were not successful. Although
a few trials were made with sugar cane,
pepper, nutmegs, cloves, gambier, tea,
cinnamon, cotton, tobacco, coconut, and
coffee, most of these experiments were un-
successful except for sugar and coconut,21)
or only sugar and coconut succeeded.
The failure of most plantations was due
mainly to failure to compete with other
European colonies over price, i.e., with
Ceylon in tea and with the Dutch East
Indies in spices.22)
The traditional life style of the ~Ialays,
subsistence agriculture, remained intact.
They grew padi, went fishing, and oc-
casionally went into the jungle to collect
cash produce. That the Malays were
able to maintain their traditional pastoral
lifestyle was due firstly to the paternalistic
20) Victor Purcell, The Memoirs of a Malayan
Official (London: Cassell & Co., 1965), p.
268.
21) jackson, op. cit., pp. 9-18. Mohamed Amin,
op. cit., p. 18.
22) Arnold Wright and Thomas H. Reid, The
Malay Peninsula (London: T. Fisher Unwin,
1913), p. 282.
policy of the British. Secondly, the
Malays lived in scattered areas, which
prevented assembly of a Malay work
force for the tin mines. Thirdly, the
cruel, miserable, hard mining work did
not attract them. Moreover, the Malays'
standard of living was higher than that
of tin mine workers at the end of nine-
teenth century. 23)
Ventures into cash crop cultivation by
Malays ended in failure. Although they
had planted coffee during the coffee
boom in the late 1880s and early 1890s,
by 1895 the price began to decline, and
subsequently disease ruined the coffee
trees. This influenced British agricul-
tural policy toward Malays later on.
With the increase of tin production,
the mainly Chinese nonagrarian pop-
ulation grew, and the British found it
necessary to supply rice to this population.
The Krian District, situated in the north-
western corner of Perak, became the main
padi-bowl of the Federated Malay States.
The land there was flat, lying only seven
to eight feet above sea level, and was
mostly covered with swamp and forest. 24)
A part of area had been cultivated long
before British rule. The soil was also
regarded as optimum for padi cultiva-
tion.25) Moreover, the proximity Krian
23) Lim, Chong Yah, Economic Development of
Modern Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1967), p. 122.
24) D. S. Short and james C. jackson, "The
Origin of an Irrigation Policy in Malaya,"
JMBRAS, vol. 44, part 1 (1971): 89.
25) Lim, Teck Ghee, Origin ofa Colonial Economy:
Land and Agriculture in Perak 1874-1897
(Penang: University Sains Malaysia, 1976),
p.49.
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,to Penang facilitated transportation.
The District Officer of Krian, Noel
Denison, was eager in establishing the
headquarters of the region, settling land
claims and collecting rents. 26) He also
improved drainage and communications,
and waived initial land rents in order to
attract Malays to grow padi in Krian.
In the early period of padi cultivation in
Krian, most immigrants came season-
ally from Penang, Province Wellesley,
and Kedah.27) They did not settle in
Krian permanently. But by 1891 the
Malay population had increased to 14,991
from 6,852 in 1879.28 ) Most of them
were Banjarese immigrants from southern
Borneo, who cultivated padi in the swamp
area, and Sumatrans. In 1889 the
amounts of land alienated for padi and
sugar were 36,455 and 20,000 acres
respectively.29)
Despite Government efforts, only 7,500
of 36,455 acres of alienated padi land
were cultivated in 1889. The unsuccess-
ful padi cultivation was due to drought,
bad harvest, disease, and lack of drinking
water. The techniques of the padi
growers also contributed. As mentioned,
most of the Malay immigrants cultivating
padi In Krian were Banjarese and
Sumatrans. They cultivated padi fol-
lowing the Muslim calendar of their
homelands, even though Krian's agrI-
cultural cycle was quite different. 30 )
26) Ibid., p. 50.
27) Short and Jackson, op. cit., p. 89.
28) Lim, Teck Ghee, Origin of a Colonial Econ-
omy... , p. 52.
29) Short and Jackson, op. cit., p. 89.
30) R. D. Hill, Rice in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur:
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As a consequence, they had to face padi
failure and many of them fled to other
Malay states.
Interestingly, apart from Krian, the
Government attempted to encourage
Chinese and Indians to grow padi,
although the result was miserable.30
They were also immigrants, and they
wished to go back their homeland with
cash, not land.
Unlike padi cultivation, sugar pro-
duction was successful in Krian. A large
amount of Malay land was sold at low
prices to the Chinese sugar plantation
owners between 1886 and 1887.32) This
was very beneficial to the Chinese
towkays, because to have cleared the land
for sugar would have cost more than
$15 per acre. 33)
The Chinese success in the sugar plan-
tations was attributed to their experience
in Province Wellesley, adequate com-
munication with Indian laborers, and
the small size of their p1antations.34)
The expansion of sugar plantations in
Krian was not entirely appreciated by
the British. In fact, the Government
intervened to restrict the conversion of
padi lands to sugar plantations, although
the restriction applied only to the newly
alienated lands.35)
The Government realized the urgent
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. Ill.
31) Lim, Teck Ghee, Origin of a Colonial Econ-
omy... , p. 74.
32) Ibid., p. 52.
33) Jackson, op. cit., p. 15.
34) Lim, Teck Ghee, Origin of a Colonial Econ-
omy... , p. Ill.
35) Ibid., p. 62.
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necessity for an irrigation scheme after
the disastrous harvest of 1895. The
impact of the padi failure on the adminis-
trators was not due to the scarcity of rice
but the decrease in revenue. 36) 1'10st
of the British administrators were indiffer-
ent to the economic condition of the
Malays in Krian.37) The Government
approved a $400,000 irrigation scheme to
irrigate 50,000 acres, but its implemen-
tation was delayed until 1898 because
of dispute between two engIneers,
O'shaughnessy and Caulfield.38) An-
other reason for the delay was the
Government's plan to construct the Kinta
Valley Railroad, which had cost two and
a half million dollars. 39) After the ir-
rigation scheme was completed in 1906,
Krian became able to export rice. In
1907, Krian exported $600,000 worth of
rice, although the State (Perak) imported
$5.7 million worth of rice in the same
year.40) The objective of the Irngation
scheme was clearly to feed the nonagrari-
an population rather than the local
populace, because prior to the com-
pletion of the irrigation pr~ject Krian
had been self-sufficient in most years.4I)
II Pre-War Colonial Agricultural
Policy (1907-1941)
Rubber
The history of the rubber industry of
Malaya begins after Sir Clements Mark-
36) Ibid., p. 58.
37) Ibid., p. 60.
38) Ibid., p. 59.
39) Loc. cit.
40) Hill, op. cit., p. 115.
41) Loc. cit.
ham and Sir Joseph Hooker Sent two
expeditions to the Amazon in 1876.
The rubber seeds and plants collected at
Kew Gardens were shipped to Singapore,
then to Malaya in 1877. The rubber
plants (Hevea brasiliensis) were raised
successfully there. 42) The first commer-
cial attempt at rubber planting in Malaya
was made by a Chinese in northeastern
Malacca in 1898, and at a later date Eu-
ropeans started establishing small estates
in various parts of the Federated Malay
States.43)
The introduction of rubber into Ma-
laya had a great impact on owners of
estates in coffee, nutmeg, pepper, and
so on. These estates were rarely suc-
cessful at the end of the nineteenth
century. For instance, pepper pro-
duction declined in the middle of 1800s
due to the low price. Coffee trees were
ruined by a fungus disease in the 1890s,
and later Brazilian coffee flooded the
world market, driving out Malayan
coffee. Thus rubber was introduced
into Malaya at a critical time. Many
coffee estates in the area between Klang
and Kuala Lumpur were converted into
rubber estates. The rubber acreage in-
creased from 345 acres in 1897 to 50,000
acres in 1905.44) The impetus for the
expansion of rubber was its high price.
The price of rubber dramatically in-
creased from $2.50 per pound in 1906
42) Robert O. Tilman, Bureaucratic Transition in
Alalaya (Dueham: Duke University Press,
1964), p. 52.
43) Ooi, Jin Bee, People and Economy in Malaya
(London: Longmans, 1963), p. 200.
44) Ibid., p. 201.
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Source: Lim, Chong Yah, Economic Development of Modern Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford
University Press, 1967), p. 176.
to $5.50 per pound in 1910. Unlike
growers of other export crops, the rubber
planters received a boost to their con-
fidence by the rise of automobile industry
in the United States.
Income from rubber export increased
tremendously between 1906 and 1916,
from $11 million to $131 million. The
percentages of tin and rubber exports in
the total exports changed from 3.80/0 of
rubber and 29.7% of tin in 1906 to
26.8% of rubber and 20.1 0/0 of tin In
1916.45)
Although the high rubber price the in-
duced the Malay peasants to grow rubber,
they were not successful in the early
period. The colonial Government dis-
couraged the expansion ofrubber planting
into the Malay peasantry. The Govern-
ment imposed higher land rents on the
Malays and the land office hook was closed
to them to prevent further applications for
rubber lands. Moreover, neither credit
nor technical assistance was given to the
Malays. Thus the Malays made errors
in the choice of rubber varieties and
45) Lim, Chong Yah, op. cit., p. 325.
98
cultivation methods.46) This policy was,
to a certain extent, an extension of
British paternalism. Since the bitter
experience of coffee failure in the peasant
sector in the late nineteenth century, the
Government had aimed at excluding the
Malays from the export crop economy.
Another reason was that the Government
needed the Malays to grow rice.
Despite the Governments discourage-
ment, the Malay peasants increased their
rubber acreage by clearing new lands
and converting the established cassava,
gambier, and coffee lands. By 1922,
918,000 acres of rubber were planted in
smallholdings, which accounted for 400/0
of the total rubber acreage.47) Of small-
holdings, 47.3 016 were owned by the
Malays.48) The Malay participation in
rubber was due to the high price of rubber
and the low price of padi. Even during
the Great Depression of the early 1930s,
it was more profitable to plant rubber
46) Lim, Teck Ghee, Peasants and Their Agri-
cultural Economy••• , p. 76.
47) Smallholding is normally under 100 acres.
Lim, Chong Yah, op. cit., p. 328.
48) Ibid., p. 332.
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rubber than to plant padi (see Table 1).
The over-heated rubber boom brought
about a land shortage. After 1905 a
large number of land brokers scoured the
countryside and persuaded Malays to
sell their lands. Some Malay immi-
grants disposed of their lands for a quick
fortune, because they could not know how
long the rubber boom would last. Other
land sales were made by the long-estab-
lished peasants, who sold their traditional
padi lands.49 ) In Selangor, 7,567 acres
of lands were sold by Malays to non-
Malays between 1909 and 1910.50) The
inflow onto Malay land of non-Malays
led the British administrators to take
action to protect "Malay benefits."
On the other hand, due to the growth
of the nonagrarian population, rice im-
ports were increasing year by year in the
early twentieth century. The Govern-
ment had to eliminate the diminution of
sawah (wet rice fields) by passing a law.
Hence, the Malay Reservation Enactment
was passed in November 1913, and a large
amount of sawah was placed in the Malay
Reservation section. Thus this act not
only protected "Malay benefits," it also
protected British benefits.
As rubber ended its second decade m
Malaya, the decline of rubber prices In
the late 1910 s influenced Government
policy. The Government opted to re-
strict rubber production, and the
Stevenson Rubber Restriction Scheme
came into effect in November 1922.
49) Lim, Teck Ghee, Peasants and Their Agri-
cultural Economy... , p. 74.
50) Ibid., p. 108.
The British Government was concerned to
maintain the high rubber price: because
it had to repay its World War I debts to
the U ni ted States, and its principal
source of income was Malayan rubber.51)
In addition, England had a quarter of
a million investors in the rubber industry,
making it necessary to maintain high
rubber prices to stabilize the stock lnarket.
There was a difference in the restric-
tions applied to smallholdings and estates.
The maximum rubber production of
smallholdings was assessed at 426 pounds
per acre per annum in February 1, 1923,
this was effective until October 31, 1928.
The average rubber production of small-
holdings was high, some examples in-
dicating a range between 599 pounds
and 1,200 pounds per acre a year. The
reason for the high productivity of the
smallholdings was that the smallholders
tapped rubber daily because they were
heavily dependent on rubber trees. 52)
But the Stevenson Committee reported
that the standard production of small-
holdings was between 320 pounds and
533 pounds per acre a year. Thus the
Committee's low assesment brought a
loss of $1 73 million to smallholders during
the period.
On the other hand, the maximum
production of estates was assessed at 400
pounds per acre per annum, although
one statistic indicated a figure of 375
pounds per acre per annum.53) The
assessment of estates was ammended to
51) Ibid., p. 142.
52) Ibid., pp. 146-147.
53) Ibid., p. 151.
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500 pounds per acre per annum in 1925,
and the restriction was lifted in 1926.
I t is clear that the Stevenson restriction
scheme effectively restricted the pro-
duction of smallholdings (the Malays
and Chinese) but not the estates (the
British) .
Discrimination was also evident in the
a pproval of new rub ber lands during
1926-1930. During this period, 292,
609 acres of land was approved for
rubber planting. Only a quarter of the
land was approved for the peasant small-
holders, and the rest was alienated
to plantations. 54) Moreover, a discrim-
inatory rubber restriction program was
applied after the Great Depression, and
the loss to peasants was estimated at $60
million during 1934-1941.55)
Padi
In 1911, 104, 428 acres of sawah were
cultivated In the Federated Malay
States.56) Due to the increase in Chinese
and Indian immigrants, domestic pro-
duction could not meet the consumption
demand. The Government had to im-
port 596, 637 tons of rice from Thailand,
Burma, Indochina, and other countries,
which supplied 54%, 36%, 9%' and 10/ 0
of the total import respectively.57) With
the peasants planting rubber and the
intrusion of the rubber estates, consider-
able areas of sawah were converted into
54) Ibid., pp. 153-154.
55) Ibid., p. 194.
56) Wright and Reid, op. cit., p. 304.
57) Cheng, Siok Hwa, The Rice Trade of Malaya




rubber. Also, some Malays who opened
rubber lands tended to neglect padi
cultivation.58)
Other factors than rubber contributed
to the decline of padi production. First,
the price of padi was low because the
Government could import rice from
Thailand and Burma. This price was
additionally lowered by middlemen. By
1912 Chinese towkays had set up eight
large rice mills in Penang, Krian, and
Kedah to handle rice from north Malaya.
They collected, milled, and redistributed
padi to the other Malay states in a
monopsony. Yet because of indebtedness
to the millers/creditors, the peasants had
to sell the padi at low prices. 59)
There were technical problems in padi
cultivation. The Malay technique was
traditional and productivity was low.
Moreover, the lack of irrigation made
padi cultivation unreliable during
droughts. On the whole, declining padi
production in the 1910s contributed to
the scarcity of rice. Between 1911 and
1916, the Federated Malay States annu-
ally imported 190,000 tons of rice, or
approximately 82°!c> of its consumption.60)
The war in Europe led the adminis-
trators to think again about nce self-
sufficiency. The dependency on Im-
ported rice made supplies uncertain in
58) Lim, Teck Ghee, Peasants and Their Agri-
cultural Economy... , p. 123.
59) Ibid., p. 155. C. R. Wharton, Jr., "Market-
ing, Merchandising, and Moneylending: A
Note on Middlemen Monopsony in Mala-
ya," The Malayan Economic Review, vol. 7,
no. 2 (October 1962): 24-44.
60) Lim, Teck Ghee, Peasants and Their Agri-
cultural EconomY"'J p. 120.
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case of warfare. Thus the Rice Lands
Enactment and Food Production En-
actment were passed in 191 7 and 1918/
1919 respectively. These Enactments
were aimed at increasing food production,
although both ended in disaster.
The rice crisis in 1918, when crop
failure of India necessitated extra imports
from Burma, and the drought in Thailand
the following year, when all rice export
was prohibited, forced the Government to
pay high prices for imported rice. 61)
These experiences led to the establishment
of the Drainage and Irrigation Depart-
ment in 1932.
The Drainage and Irrigation Depart-
ment opened two irrigation schemes:
the Panchang Bedina Scheme in Kuala
Selangor and the Sungei lVlanik Scheme
in Lower Perak. The schemes were
successful, bringing a total of 15,000
cultivated acres under irrigation. By
1939, 170,000 of the 250,000 acres of
sawah in the Federated Malay States and
the Straits Settlements were irrigated.6Z)
But despite the efforts of the Drainage
and Irrigation Department, the padi
yield increased only slightly during 1932-
1938.
In August 1939, Sir Shenton Thomas
proposed opening the Malay rice mo-
nopoly to non-Malays.63) His objective
was to increase production. Unlike in
the early 1900s, the immigrants' con-
ditions had deteriorated in 1930s so that
61) Ibid., pp. 120-122.
62) Ibid., p. 183.
63) Virginia Thompson, Postmortem on Malaya
(New York: The MacMillan Company,
1943), p. 35.
some Chinese sought to take up padi
planting. But Thomas's proposal was
attacked by Majlis,64) the Malay nation-
alists' organ, and the proposal was
dropped. The Malays' grievance against
the proposal was that if non-Malays
intruded into padi production, they could
not maintain their values, culture, and
economy. Thus Thomas's proposal was
a great threat to Malay society. On the
other hand, had the Government the
policy, it could not have maintained
Malay support. As a result, no adequate
solution was found to the scarcity of
padi.
III Agricultural Policy After the
Independence (1957-1978)
Political Setting of Pre-independence Period
The agricultural policy between 1942
and 1956 was very vague, due to the
Pacific War, the Emergency and pre-
independence political chaos. However,
it is important to mention briefly the
political struggle and the nationalist
movement of this period, because of their
influence on post-independence agricul-
tural policy.
Nationalist movements of the pre-war
period were basically pursued at the
communal level. A conspicuous nation-
alist movement started with the formation
in 1946 of the United Malay National
Organization (U. M. N. 0.), which op-
posed vehemently the Malayan Union
64) Majlis was founded by Abdul Rahim Kajai
in 1931. William R. Roff, The Origins of
Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: Univer-
sity of Malaya Press, 1967), p. 146.
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proposa1.65) Conversly, other ethnic
groups, such as the Chinese and Indians,
were mostly apathetic toward politics,
except for the communists.
The communist armed struggle,
started in 1948, created an important
framework in Malaysian politics. The
Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.)
was founded as a countermovement
against the communists. The V.M.N.
0., M.C.A., and the Malayan Indian
Congress (M.I.C.) merged into the Al-
liance, reconciling their political differ-
ences. Malaysian politics was moved
by the Alliance, or more precisely,
on the U. M. N. O.'s initiative. The
V.M.N.O. won all elections due to
favorable constituency and citizenship
laws for the Malays. Thus Government
policies became tinged with "Malay
color."66)
In order to maintain political stability,
the Alliance Government had to show
its ability through the implementation of
social and economic development pro-
jects.67) The Government emphasized
65) The Nationalism movements in the pre-war
period are described in the following books
and articles: Radin Soenarno, "Malay
Nationalism, 1896-1941," Journal Southeast
Asian History, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 1960):
1-28; T. H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz,
"Nationalism in Malaya," in William L.
Holland, ed., Asian Nationalism and the West
(New York: The MacMillan Company,
1953); William R. Roff, The Origin of Malay
Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: University of
Malaya Press, 1967).
66) More detailed information can be found in:
Anthony Short, "Communism and the
Emergency," in Wang Gungwu, ed., Ma-
laysia: A Survey (New York: Frederick A.
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rural development, since most of the rural
inhabitants were Malays. Its policy
did not meet with strong opposition
from the other Alliance parties, because
these parties had to accommodate the
U.M.N.O. to maintain their power.
One noteworthy source of grievance
between the Malays and Chinese was the
"New Village." The New Village, cre-
ated during the Emergency period, was
well-equipped with modern facilities.
Most of its residents were Chinese, while
the Malays were left in the rural areas
without proper Government aid. At the
same time, the Malays were fighting
against the communists (Chinese).68)
Moreover, the New Village brought a
demographic change in Malaya. Some
500,000 of the rural Chinese were forced
to move to the urban areas, and this
made them more prosperous.
FELDA
The independence of the Federation of
Malaya in 1957 influenced the segre-
gation of political and economic powers
among such ethnic groups as the Malays
and Chinese. The Malays predominantly
held political power and the Chinese
maintained the economic power.
Praeger, 1964); ]. Norman Parmer, "Ma-
laysia," in George McTurnan Kahin, ed.,
Government and Politics cif Southeast Asia
(Ithacca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1969); K.]. Ratnam, Communalism and
the Political Process in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur:
University of Malaya Press, 1965).
67) Gayl D. Ness, Bureaucracy and Rural Develop-
ment in Malaysia (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1967), p. 143.
68) Ibid., p. 99.
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The Malays, unlike the Chinese and
Indians, had lived in the traditional
rural society throughout the British co-
lonial period. They were basically padi
cuItiva tors and had a lower economic
standard than the other ethnic groups.
Thus the Government was accutely con-
cerned to improve the Malays' economic
condition, and instigated several rural
development projects. The Federal
Land Development Authority (FELDA)
was one of these projects.
FELDA was established In 1956. Its
objectives were to promote economIC
advancement through rural settlements
and to provide "land for the landless."69)
It should be noted that twenty percent
of all FELDA's schemes were reserved
for former members of the security
forces, largely Malays.7°) The other
important aim of the project was to create
a number of small urban centers on the
outskirts of the residential areas.7 l ) The
objectives implied a pro-Malay policy.
However, there was an exception in the
early stage of FELDA's development
project. The Bilut Valley Scheme
opened in 1958, for example, was the
first scheme and was directly administered
by FELDA. The ethnic composition
was Malays 65.3%' Chinese 26.6%, and
Indians 8.10/0' unlike the other schemes
which were exclusively for Malays. The
Bilut Valley Scheme was established for
69) Kent Mulliner, "Toward a Silent Revolu-
tion: Rural Development Policy Changes in
West Malaysia" (Master's thesis, Northern
Illinois University, 1969), p. 106.
70) Ibid., p. 107.
71) MacAndrews, op. cit., p. 54.
the purpose of moving rural Chinese
into a "New Village" during the Emer-
gency.
FELDA's function until 1961 was as
a planning and financing board. Settlers
cleared the forest, planted their own
export crops, and built their own houses,
and thus the rate of development of the
schemes was very slow. In addition,
the schemes were administered by the
state governments, which tended to send
dissidents to participate.72) As a result
of the difficulty of pioneering work and
the inefficiency of administrators, FELDA
schemes made far from the expected
progress.
A dramatic change came in 1961-1962
after FELDA took over management of
all schemes except one in Kelantan.
Under the new administration, pioneering
jobs were carried out by contractors,
largely Chinese. The contractors cleared
the jungle, planted rubber, oil palm and
cover crops, built roads and houses for
both staff and villagers. In addition,
they maintained the planted trees and
cover crops for from six months to a
year until the settlers arrived.73)
The use of contractors for the pIO-
neering work was due to the settlers'
72) Karl]. Pelzer, "The Plantation as the Model
for Pioneer Settlement Sponsored by the
. Malaysian Government," in Wayne Ray-
mond and Kent Mulliner, ed., Southeast Asia,
An Emerging Center of World Influence? Eco-
nomic and Resource Consideration (Papers in
International Studies, Southeast Asia Series,
no. 42) (Athens: Ohio University, Center
for International Studies, Southeast Asia
Program, 1977), p. 118.
73) Ibid., p. 119.
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unpreparedness for the job. The settlers'
previous occupations in the Bilut Valley
Scheme, for example, were padi
cultivators (13.1 %), agricultural laborers
(14.80/0)' estate workers (16.4%), and
Government ex-servicemen (11.50/0).74)
They were not familiar with pioneering
work.
Another important change took place
in the mid 1960s, when oil palm became
the main cash crop in the schemes. Oil
palm has several advantages over rubber,
a shorter growing period, a higher income,
and a lower labor requirement for
harvest. Overall, 448,662 acres oil
palm and 259,812 acres of rubber had
been planted by mid 1975.75) In the 18
years from 1956 to 1975, FELDA opened
167 schemes and settled 34,100 settler
families, of which 96.2% were Malays.
The revenues from rubber and palm oil
produced in the FELDA schemes were
M$64.2 million and M$124.0 million in
1974 respectively. These figures indicate
that the rubber and palm oil produced
account for 2.2% and 11.40/0 of the total
export from West Malaysia.
The average income of the settler
families was M$421.3 per month in the
DIu Jempol Scheme in 1975.76) The
crop cultivated was oil palm, first planted
in 1963. The settlers' previous occu-
pations and monthly incomes were agri-
culture (M$96.8), business (M$300),
Government (M$187.6), and others
(M$133.8).77) The previous average in-
74) MacAndrews, op. cit., p. 105.
75) Ibid., p. 62.
76) Ibid., p. 159.
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come per month was M$127.4. Thus
their income was increased through
participation in the FELDA scheme.
As described earlier, 96.2°,10 of the total
settlers were Malays, who thus enjoyed
the benefit of FELDA. Having con-
tributed to foreign exchange, FELDA
improved the Malays' standard of living.
Muda Irrigation Scheme
The Muda region IS situated in the
coastal plains of Kedah and Perlis. The
majority of residents in the region are
Malays, predominantly engaged in padi
farming. The padi production in Kedah
and Perlis for 1967-1968 harvest season
was 305,220 tons, accounting for 51 % of
the total padi production in West Ma-
laysia. Due to rice shortage, the Govern-
ment imported 247,000 tons of rice in
1968. The cultivated padi acreage in
the region was 354,390 acres, or 39.10/0
of the total padi acreage in the same
year.78 ) The Muda region is the rice-
bowl of West Malaysia.
The traditional agricultural cycle in
the Muda region was as follows: at the
end of April, the peasants burned the
remaining padi stalks on the sawah;
plowed the sawah from June to July;
planted padi at the end of August; and
harvested padi in January. The average
land ownership and cultivated acreage
were 3.7 acres and 4.6 acres respectively
In 1964.79) Thus 0.9 acres of the
77) Ibid., p. 155.
78) Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Sta-
tistical Digest (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries, 1969), p. 186.
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cultivated sawah was tenanted.
The income from agriculture varied
according to the size of cultivated sawah.
An area of 0.7-4.2 acres of sawah earned
M$427-M$702 in 1964. Most of the
peasants with this income had a certain
amount of debt.80) They tended to
borrow money from the Chinese towkays,
because the institutional banking organi-
zations required collateral such as land,
and the land title rarely coincided with
the de facto owner due to the lVlalay land
inheritance system. Thus the peasants
borrowed from the Chinese and repaid
their debts in padi after the harvest. The
peasants had to obtain at least 4.9 acres
of sawah to abolish their indebtedness.8U
A dramatic change took place w hen the
construction of two reserviors started in
mid 1966. The Government invested
M$250 million to the Muda Irrigation
Scheme, constructing the Pedu and Muda
dams, a 61-mile-Iong main canal, a
564-mile-long branch canal and dis-
tributary, a tidal barrage, 480 miles of
farm roads, etc.82) The scheme aimed
at irrigating 250,000 acres of sawah in
which 50,000 farm families or 325,000
people resided, and making double-
79) Masuo Kuchiba, Yoshihiro Tsubouchi, and
Narifumi Maeda, "A Padi Farming Village
in the Northwestern Part of Malaya,
Interim Report - The Fragmentation of
Landholding," Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 3,
no. 1 (1965): 38.
80) Ibid., p. 46.
81) Lac. cit.
82) Federal Department of Information, The
Muda Irrigation Scheme (Kuala Lumpur:
Federal Department of Information, 1968?),
pp.7-9.
cropping possible. At the end of 1974,
the yield of padi in Muda increased to
750,000 tons, which diminished nee
imports In 1975 to 79,000 tons. The
Increase of padi production certainly
eased the trade balance and stabilized
the rice supply.
Double-cropping necessitated an ad-
ditional investment in infrastructure, l.e.,
in drying complexes and rice mills. The
National Padi and Rice Authority (LNP)
dries, mills, and purchases padi from the
peasants. The drying and storage of
padi is an important factor in double-
cropping, because one crop is harvested
during the rainy season. The LPN
also guaranteed the minimum price of
padi at M$16 a picul and is obliged to
purchase every single grain of padi.
Thus the padi price was maintained at
a reasonably high level. As a matter of
fact, the padi price was between M$29
and M$30.50 a picul in March, 1975.83)
A further important role played by the
LPN was to replace the Chinese monop-
sony of milling and purchasing of padi.
As described earlier, one of the main
reasons for the poverty of Malays was the
Chinese monopsony of rice. With re-
spect to the credit, the Muda Agricultural
development Authority (MADA), estab-
lished in 1970, is helping the peasants to
get an up-to-date register on land tenure
with assistance from the University Sains
83) Cheong, Mei Sui, "More vVater Means
More Rice Means More Money for Thou-
sands of Kedah and Perlis Families," in The
Straits Times, ed., The Straits Times AnnualJ
1976 (Singapore: Times Publishing Bhd.,
1976), p. 145.
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Malaysia in Penang.84) A land title
is the most acceptable collateral for credit
from the institutional banking organi-
zations. But only a few banks are able
to offer credit since most land is in the
Reservations. Credit is available to pur-
chase such agricultural inputs as fertilizer,
insecticide, and agricultural machines.
Thus, unlike with credit from the mid-
dlemen (the Chinese), the peasants are
not subject to the price manipulation of
padi.
Apart from encouraging self-sufficiency,
the schemes have also influenced the life-
style of the Malays. MADA has in-
troduced advanced agricultural tech-
niques, including the use of tractors,
harvesters, fertilizer, insecticides, and
seeds. As described earlier, the tradi-
tional agricultural cycle kept farmers in
sawah for nine months (April-January).
The peasants planted various types of
padi which had different harvest seasons,
thus the harvests lasted for three months.
MADA first standardized the agricultural
cycle, then introduced high-yielding and
early-ripening varieties of padi. The
average yield of padi per acre increased
from 508 gantangs in 1968 to 666 gantangs
in 1975. On the other hand, the life of
the peasantry has become busier due to
the introduction of the short-ripening
varieties of padi. MADA irrigates the
sawah at a set time and the peasants have
to plant padi in this period regardless
of their wishes.
The improvement of the peasants'
84) Ibid., p. 144.
106
economic standard is observed from the
following factors: the average net family
income has increased to M$3,200 per
annum compared to M$427-M$702, as
mentioned earlier. The peasant's savings
in commercial banks increased fromM$5
million in 1965 to M$23 million in 1972.
The number of motor-cycles increased to
40,000 in 1972, and the number of cars
almost doubled from 8,000 to 15,000
during the same period.85)
On the whole, the evidence all indicates
that the economic improvement of the
peasants and MADA's contribution to
padi self-sufficiency in the Muda region
were successful. Yet as the general
manager of MADA said: "Changing
values and habits is perhaps the most
difficult of all our responsibilities. When
we solve the human problem - and it
is not going to be easy - then Muda is
going to be an unqualified success. "86)
But would the change of Malays' values
and habits coincide with their happiness?
Conclusion
The early British agricultural policy
toward the Malay populace was to
leave the Malays in the rural areas
and encourage them to maintain the
traditional way of life cultivating padi.
Two factors underlay this policy: British
paternalism, and politico-economic rea-
sons. The British administrators had
favorable feelings toward the Malays,
and this certainly influenced the colonial
administration. Moreover, the increase
85) Ibid., pp. 141-143.
86) Ibid., p. 144.
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of nonagrarian immigrants contributed
to the need for a stable rice supply. Thus
the administrators insisted that the Ma-
lays should stay in the kampongs and
supply rice cheaply. The influx of non-
agrarian immigrants also kept down the
wages of laborers. However, some Ma-
lays engaged in coffee cultivation in the
late 1800s, but without success. This
incident influenced later agricultural
policy.
The introduction of rubber changed
the economic map of Malaya completely.
Many Europeans and some Chinese
owned rubber plantations, unlike the
Malays who were encouraged to remain
in the kampongs as padi cultivators. The
Government, again, encouraged the Ma-
lays to grow padi which would contribute
to padi self-sufficiency. The Govern-
ment, at the same time, discouraged
Malays from planting rubber. The Gov-
ernment's idea was to keep the Malays as
padi farmers. The Government needed
a domestic rice supply due to warfare in
Europe and an unstable rice supply from
Thailand, Burma, and Indo-china. It
also had to reduce rubber production due
to the low price during the Depression in
the 1920s and 1930s. Apart from the
politico-economic reasons, British pater-
nalism had induced the adrninistrators
to follow this policy. But the necessity
for padi self-sufficiency brought Sir
Shenton Thomas's proposal which aimed
at inducing Chinese into padi cultivation.
The proposal was strongly opposed by
the Malay nationalists and was dropped
as a result.
After independence the Malayan Gov-
ernment encouraged the Malays to culti-
vate rubber. FELDA was set up in
1956, and FELDA settlers were mostly
Malays. The Government's efforts to
develop the rural areas eventually brought
the Malays socio-economic development.
The Muda Irrigatioll" Scheme was also
established with the same objective,
although the Scheme was expected to
raise padi self-sufficiency.
In all these rural development pro-
jects the Malays were dependent on the
Government. This dependency was due
partly to the Malay nature, but mostly
to British paternalism, which took away
self-dependence from the Malays and
discouraged co-operation. Furthermore,
the Chinese and Indians destroyed the
traditional l\lalay commercial mecha-
nism.87)
On the other hand, FELDA and the
Muda Irrigation Scheme were the out-
come of an effort to retain the political
support of the Malay populace. Two
major powers contested the election of
1969. The Pan Malayan Islamic Party
(PAS), a communal Malay party, op-
posed V.M.N.O., which comprOlnised
with other ethnic groups. There were
also several "non-communal parties,"
which were mostly Chinese-dominated
and condemned the M.e.A.'s compromise
with the ·~vlalays. The May 13 riot
87) Ness, op. cit., p. 126. Alatas mentioned the
Malays' participation in commerce and
industry before the British invasion of Mala-
ya. Syed Hussein Alatas, The Myth of the
Lazy Native (London: Frank Cass, 1977),
p.126.
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happened due to this political dissatis-
faction. More precisely, the riot in-
dicated the appearance of class con-
sciousness. Thus, as the Third Malaysia
Plan indicates, the Government has to
change its policy slightly from a pro-
Malay policy to a non-communal devel-
opment policy.88) -Nevertheless, the pro-
Malay policy is still a main Government
Issue. As a matter of fact, the recent
political power shift from PAS to the
U.M.N.O. in Kelantan will certainly
bring about the implementation ofvarious
rural (Malay) development projects In
the state.
So far, the Government's projects are
working fairly well. But the dependence
of the project crops (rubber and palm
oil) on the world markets has destabilized
the farmers' economic situation. More-
over, the drought in the Muda Scheme
may create grievances among the people.
Thus the accomplishment of agricultural
development is a strong factor in Ma-
laysian politics. The Government should
seek to ensure the success of agricultural
development in order to stabilize the
political situation of Malaysia.
Ackno~ledge~ent
The author thanks Mr. Kent Mulliner of Ohio




Alatas, Syed Hussein. The Myth ofthe Lazy Native.
88) The Malaysian Government, Third Ma-
laysia Plan, 1976-1980 (Kuala Lumpur: The
Government Press, 1976), pp. 43-45.
108
London: Frank Cass, 1977.
Amin, Mohamed, and Calbwell, Malcom, ed.
Malaya: The Making of a Neo-Colony. Notting-
ham: Spokesman, 1977.
Cheng, Siok Hwa. The Rice Trade of .il1alaya.
Singapore: University Education Press, 1973.
Esman, Milton J. Administration and Development
in Malaysia. Ithacca: Cornell University Press,
1972.
Gullick, J. M. Indigeneous Political System of West-
ern Malaya. London: The Athlone Press, 1958.
Hill, R. D. Rice in Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: Ox-
ford University Press, 1977.
Jackson, R. N. Immigrant Labour and the Develop-
ment qf Malaya 1786-1920. Kuala Lumpur:
Government Press, 1961.
Lim, Chong Yah. Economic Development qf Mod-
ern Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press, 1967.
Lim, Teck Ghee. Origin of a Colonial Economy:
Land and Agriculture in Perak 1874-1897. Pe-
nang: University Sains Malaysia, 1976.
Peasants and Their Agricultural Economy
in Colonial Malaya 1874-1941. Penang: Univer-
sity Sains Malaysia, 1977.
MacAndrews, Colin. Mobility and Modernization:
The Federal Land Development Authority and Its
Role in Modernising the Rural Malay. Yogya-
karta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1977.
Maeda, Kiyoshige. Alor Janggus, A Chinese Com-
munity in Malaya. Kyoto: The Center for
Southeast Asian Studies, 1967.
Middlebrook, S. M., and Pinnick, A. W. How
Malaya is Governed. New York: AMS Press,
1975.
Ness, Gayl D. Bureaucracy and Rural Development in
Malaysia. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1967.
Ooi, .lin Bee. People and Economy til Malaya.
London: Longmans, 1963.
Parmer, J. Norman. "Malaysia," in George
McTurnan Kahin, ed. Government and Politics of
Southeast Asia. Ithacca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1969.
Purcell, Victor. The Memoirs ofa Mala.yan Qlficial.
London: Cassell & Co., 1965.
Ratnam, K. J. Communalism and the Political Pro-
cess in Malqya. Kuala Lumpur: University of
Malaya Press, 1965.
Roff, William R. The Origins of Malay National-
Y. SHIMOMOTO: Agricultural Development Policy in West Malaysia
ism. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya
Press, 1967.
Short, Anthony. "Communism and the Emer-
gency," in \Nang Gungwu, ed. Malaysia: A
Survey. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.
Silcock, T. H., and Aziz, Ungku Abdul. "Na-
tionalism in Malaya," in William L. Holland,
cd. Asian Nationalism alld the West. New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1953.
Stevenson, Rex. Cultivators and Administrators.
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Swettenham, Sir Frank A. British Malaya: An
Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence
in Malaya. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd.,
1906.
Thompson, Virginia. Postmortem on Alalaya. New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1943.
Tilman, Robert O. Bureaucratic Transition in
Malaya. Dueham: Duke University Press,
1964.
Wright, Arnold, and Reid, Thomas H. The
Malay Peninsula. London: T. Fisher Unwin,
1913.
B. journals
Jackson, James C. "Rice Cultivation in West
Malaysia." jMBRAS, vol. 45, part 2 (1972):
76-96.
Kuchiba, ~Iasuo, Tsubouchi, Yoshihiro, and
Maeda, Narifumi. "A Padi Farming Village
in the Northwestern Part of Malaya, Interim
Report - The Fragmentation of Landhold-
ing." Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1
(1965): 22-51.
Short, D. S., and Jackson, James C. "The Origin
of an Irrigation Policy in Malaya." j MBRAS,
vol. 44, part 1 (1971): 78-103.
Soenarno, Radin. "Malay Nationalism, 1896-
1941." J oumal Southeast Asian History, vol. 1,
no. 1 (March 1960): 1-28.
\Vharton, C. R., Jr. "Marketing, Merchandis-
ing, and Moneylending: A Note on Middleman
Monopsony in Malaya." The Malayan Economic
Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (October 1962): 24-44.
\Vikkramatileke, R. "Variable Ethnic Attributes
in Malayan Rural Land Development." Pa-
cific Viewpoint, v. 5 (May 1964): 35-50.
C. lvIiscellaneous
Cheong, Mei Sui. "l\10re \Vater Means More
Rice Means More Money for Thousands of
Kedah and Perlis Families," in The Straits
Times, ed. The Straits Times Annual/1976.
Singapore: Times Publishing Bhd., 1976.
Federal Department of Information. The Muda
Irrigation Scheme. Kuala Lumpur: Federal De-
partment of Information, 1968?
Malaysia Government. Malaysia 1975 Official
Year Book. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia Govern-
ment, 1977.
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Statistical
Digest. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Fisheries, 1969.
Mulliner, Kent. "Toward a Silent Revolution:
Rural Development Policy Changes in West
Malaysia" (Master's theses, Northern Illinoi
University, 1969).
Pelzer, Karl J. "The Plantation as the Model for
Pioneer Settlement Sponsored by the Malaysian
Government," in \Vayne Rayrnond and Kent
Mullincr, cd. Southeast Asia, All Emerging Center
C!f World I'!fluence? Economic and Resource Con-
sideration (Papers In International Studies,
Southeast Asia Series, no. 42). Athens: Ohio
University, Center for International Studies,
Southeast Asia Program, 1977.
The Malaysian Government. Third Malaysia
Plan, 1976-1980. Kuala Lumpur: The Govern-
ment Press, 1976.
109
